

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 02071 01 OF 12 081619Z

42

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 IO-14

OIC-04 AECE-00 AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00

CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 12 VIENNA 2071

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN

REPRESENTATIVES MARCH 7, 1974

FROM US REP MBFR

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT ON INFORMAL SESSION
DISCUSSION TRANSMITTED IN VIENNA 2061.

7. SPEAKING FROM TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY AD HOC
GROUP, FRG REP OPENED DISCUSSION. HE SAID LAST
SESSION HAD BEEN USEFUL AND ALLIED REPS HOPED THEY
COULD CONTINUE PRODUCTIVE. TWO MAIN PROBLEMS
PARTICIPANTS FACED WERE HOW TO DEFINE AGREED OUTCOME
FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND HOW TO ACHIEVE THIS OUTCOME. HE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 02071 01 OF 12 081619Z

HAD EXPLAINED IN THE LAST SESSION THAT PARTICIPANTS

NEEDED AN OUTCOME WHICH TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE HISTORICAL REALITIES OF TODAY'S EUROPE, THAT LOOKED FORWARD AND NOT BACK, AND WAS AN OUTCOME SUITABLE FOR CODIFYING THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE. PARTICIPANTS NEEDED AS AN OUTCOME AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A SUITABLE BASIS FOR EAST/WEST RELATIONS. SUCH AN AGREEMENT COULD NOT MERELY PRESERVE THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ALLIED REPS DID NOT WISH TO GIVE THIS RELATIONSHIP FORMAL APPROVAL THROUGH SIGNATURE OF AN AGREEMENT.

8. FRG REP NOTED, THAT DURING PREVIOUS INFORMAL SESSION, WARSAW PACT REPS HAD PRESENTED MODIFIED VERSION OF THEIR FIRST STAGE REDUCTION PROPOSAL. WHILE ALLIED REPS WELCOMED ALL INDICATIONS OF FLEXIBILITY, THIS EASTERN PROPOSAL ENTAILED THE SAME BASIC DIFFICULTIES AS PREVIOUS ONES. IF ACCEPTED, IT WOULD ENSHRINE AND PRESERVE THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE WEST. ON THE OTHER HAND, ALLIED COMMON CEILING IDEA WAS EQUITABLE OUTCOME FOR NEGOTIATIONS. SOVIET UNION WOULD RETAIN THE ADVANTAGE OF ITS REINFORCEMENT CAPACITY IN THE EVENT OF EMERGENCIES. AGREEMENT ON THESE LINES WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD BY PUBLIC OPINION IN EAST AND WEST, AND WOULD PROVIDE A FAIR AND EQUAL LONG-TERM BASIS FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS. POLISH REP HAD ASSERTED IN PLENARY EARLIER SAME DAY THAT WEST WAS SEEKING TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES THROUGH COMMON CEILING PROPOSAL. FOR THEIR PART, ALLIED REPS VIEWED EASTERN PROPOSAL AS INTENDED TO PRESERVE PRESENT UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE OF EAST IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS IN PARTICULAR WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHERE THE PROCESS OF TROOP REDUCTIONS WOULD LEAD THEM AND WHETHER IT WOULD ACHIEVE GREATER STABILITY. TO HAVE EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT WAS THE WAY TO ASSURE THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. IN THE LAST INFORMAL SESSION, EASTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WAS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 02071 01 OF 12 081619Z

CONTROVERSIAL AND INADEQUATE. POLISH REP HAD ALSO CRITICIZED THIS CONCEPT IN PLENARY STATEMENT EARLIER SAME DAY. HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK EASTERN REPS TO BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT THEIR OBJECTIONS TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT.

9. POLISH REP SAID HE AGREED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT SESSIONS WAS TO SEARCH FOR SOME UNDERSTANDING.

PRESENT SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS WAS FOCUSED ON THE QUESTION OF GROUND FORCES. IN THE PRESENT SERIES, WESTERN REPS HAD CONCENTRATED THUS FAR ON THE REDUCTION OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES AND HAD RESTATED ALREADY KNOWN DETAILS ESPECIALLY AS CONCERNS THE PROPORTION OF REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EAST AND WEST AND TO RESTRICTION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION TO THE SECOND PHASE. HOWEVER, AT THE OUTSET OF THESE SESSION, EASTERN REPS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE WESTERN REPS HAD NEW THINGS TO SAY ON THE REDUCTIONS OF OTHER GROUND FORCES. BUT IN PRACTICE, WHAT WESTERN REPS HAD SAID ON THIS SUBJECT WAS NO MORE THAN WHAT HAD BEEN SAID IN PLENARY SESSION; NAMELY, THAT ALLIED REPS WERE WILLING TO DISCUSS AND OBLIGATION TO CONTINUE TO DISCUSS NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND ROUND, AND SECOND, THAT THE COMMON CEILING WAS A NECESSITY AS FRG REP HAD MENTIONED.

10. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT, FOR THEIR PART, EASTERN REPS HAD TRIED TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT IN A BROADER WAY. THEY HAD POINTED OUT THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL IN THE FORM PROPOSED BECAUSE IT INVOLVED DISPROPORTIONATE REDUCTIONS, FAR LARGER FOR EAST THAN FOR WEST, AND CONTAINED STRICT DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN PHASES. MOREOVER, PHASE II WAS UNCLEAR. HE HAD ASKED A MAJOR QUESTION IN THE FIRST SESSION: WHAT WOULD HAPPEN WITH THE OTHER FORCES? THIS QUESTION HAD NOT BEEN ANSWERED BY ALLIED REPS. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD LOOK FOR A WAY TO MAKE MORE PROGRESS. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT SOME IDEAS FLOATED IN THE LAST SESSION SEEMED TO HIM A POSSIBLE WAY FORWARD. IT WAS NECESSARY TO IMPROVE THE RELATIONSHIP OF REDUCTIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BY FINDING SOME COMBINATION

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENNA 02071 01 OF 12 081619Z

OF FORCE ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD MAKE A MORE EQUITABLE PACKAGE. SECOND, THE IDEA OF A SYMBOLIC REDUCTION WHICH WOULD BE POLITICALLY IMPORTANT, NOT CAUSE ANY DECREASE IN THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTY BUT BE A MEANINGFUL BEGINNING. THIS SHOULD BE STUDIED FURTHER.

11. POLISH REP SAID FRG REP HAD ASKED ABOUT EASTERN POSITION ON COMMON CEILING. THE COMMON CEILING AS IT HAD BEEN PROPOSED BY WESTERN REPS AND AS IT STOOD IN WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS WAS AN EXTENSION OF THE THEORY OF DISPARITIES. THE WEST TOOK A SINGLE FORCE ELEMENT WHERE IT WAS AT A DISADVANTAGE AND BUILT AN ENTIRE REDUCTION PROPOSAL ON IT. THAT A DISTORTED VIEW OF PARITY. IT TOOK MUCH MORE THAN

GROUND FORCES TO GET A REAL PICTURE OF PARITY IN
CENTRAL EUROPE. WHAT ALLIES HAD PROPOSED COULD NOT
BE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. MOREOVER, ALLIES PROPOSED THAT THE
CONCEPT OF COMMON CEILING BE ACCEPTED AT THE VERY OUTSET WHICH
MADE IT ADDITIONALLY DIFFICULT. IT WAS NECESSARY
TO FIND A WAY TO MAKE A BEGINNING FIRST. EAST
COULD NOT ACCEPT THE THEORY OF DISPARITIES AS A STARTING
POINT. WESTERN POSITION WAS A CATEGORICAL ONE.
ALLIED REPS WERE TELLING EAST THAT THEIR COMMON CEILING IDEA
SHOULD BE ACCEPTED OR THERE WOULD BE NO REDUCTIONS AT ALL.

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 02071 02 OF 12 081632Z

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 IO-14

OIC-04 AECE-00 AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 12 VIENNA 2071

FROM US REP MBFR

12. FRG REP SAID POLISH REP HAD CLAIMED THE ALLIES HAD NO
ANSWER ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED TO OTHER FORCES. TO THE CONTRARY,
COMMON CEILING SHOWED THE GOAL TOWARDS WHICH ALLIES WERE MOV-
ING AND MADE CLEAR THE DIMENSIONS OF OVERALL ALLIED REDUCTION

PROPOSAL. AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, EASTERN REPS WERE OBJECTING THAT THE COMMON CEILING APPLIED ONLY TO GROUND FORCES AND WOULD NOT INCLUDE ALL FORCE ELEMENTS. WAS THIS THE SOLE OBJECTION OF THE EAST? WAS THE EAST OBJECTING TO A COMMON CEILING ON MANPOWER AS A CONCEPT?

13. POLISH REP SAID FRG REP WAS OBJECTING TO THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. EASTERN REPS WERE NOT ARGUING, AS CLAIMED BY WEST, THAT THE SPECIAL VIRTUE OF THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WAS THAT IT WAS A PRODUCT
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SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 02071 02 OF 12 081632Z

OF HISTORY. THE VIRTUE OF THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WAS THAT IT HAD MAINTAINED SECURITY AND KEPT THE PEACE FOR A NUMBER OF DECADES. IN ANSWER TO FRG REP'S QUESTION, HE WOULD SAY THAT EACH SIDE HAD ITS OWN WAY OF MEASURING ITS OWN SECURITY NEEDS AND OF DEVELOPING A COMBINED DEFENSE POTENTIAL. THIS PROCESS HAD RESULTED IN A CERTAIN RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WHICH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES CONSIDERED PROVIDED FOR THEIR SECURITY. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD PROCEED WITH THE REDUCTIONS IN A WAY WHICH WOULD NOT DISTURB THAT RELATIONSHIP AND THUS THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTICIPANT.

14. FRG REP SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE POLISH REP HAD ANSWERED HIS QUESTION ABOUT EASTERN OBJECTIONS TO THE COMMON CEILING AND REPEATED IT. AFTER A SIDE DISCUSSION WITH STRULAK AND SMIRNOVSKY, SOVIET REP KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO ANSWER THE QUESTION. HE SAID THE EASTERN APPROACH TO THE IDEA OF CEILINGS WAS THAT, AFTER REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES, A CEILING FOR ARMED FORCES FOR EACH COUNTRY SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED. THIS CEILING WOULD BE DETERMINED THROUGH THE REDUCTION OF EACH ELEMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT. THAT WAS TO SAY THAT THE EASTERN APPROACH CONSISTS OF ESTABLISHING CEILINGS THROUGH THE REDUCTION OF EACH ARMED FORCE IN THE AREA. THIS SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE FOR REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. THROUGH REDUCTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF EACH PARTICIPATING COUNTRY BY A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE, A COMMON CEILING (SIC) ON THE MANPOWER OF EACH NATIONAL FORCE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED. IN THIS WAY, A COMMON CEILING ON MANPOWER WOULD BE ACHIEVED. EAST NATURALLY ALSO HAD IN MIND PARALLEL REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. THUS, ACCORDING TO THE EASTERN APPROACH, THE CRITERION FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF EACH NATIONAL CEILING WAS MANPOWER PLUS THOSE ARMAMENTS WHICH WERE CONNECTED WITH THE MANPOWER OF EACH ARMED FORCE. THIS APPROACH WOULD AVOID A SITUATION WHERE MANPOWER WAS THE ONLY ELEMENT REDUCED AND ARMAMENTS WERE LEFT UNTOUCHED. THUS, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO REDUCE THE MANPOWER OF AN ARMORED UNIT WHILE LEAVING ITS TANKS IN THE AREA. THE EASTERN APPROACH FOCUSED ON SIMULTANEOUS REDUCTION OF MANPOWER PLUS ARMAMENTS.

15. AFTER FURTHER QUESTIONS ON SAME LINE BY ALLIED REPS,
KHLESTOV SAID THAT THERE WAS NO PROVISION FOR A COMMON
CEILING IN THE EASTERN CONCEPT. THE WESTERN COMMON CEILING
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 02071 02 OF 12 081632Z

CONCEPT WAS IN ANY EVENT BASED SOLELY ON GROUND FORCES.
GDR REP SAID EASTERN APPROACH STRESSED THE INTER-CONNECTION
OF MANPOWER AND ARMAMENTS. THIS GAVE A BETTER MEASUREMENT
OF MILITARY CAPACITY THAT MANPOWER ALONE.

16. FRG REP SAID, IF HE UNDERSTOOD EASTERN REMARKS CORRECTLY,
EASTERN OBJECTIONS TO THE COMMON CEILING WERE THAT THE COMMON
CEILING CONCEPT WAS BASED ON GROUND FORCES ONLY. EASTERN
REPS ALSO APPARENTLY OBJECTED TO THE MORE GENERAL CONCEPT OF
A COMMON CEILING ON MANPOWER. SOVIET REP REPLIED THAT WESTERN
REPS SPOKE IN TERMS OF A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MAN-
POWER. FOR HIS PART, HE HAD NEVER FULLY UNDERSTOOD THIS VIEW-
POINT. APPARENTLY WESTERN REPS MEANT ONLY MANPOWER WITHOUT
ARMAMENTS. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY THOUGHT THAT THEY MADE SOME
CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO. BUT NOW HE MUST CONCLUDE THAT
ALLIED SUGGESTION OF A COMMON CEILING ON MANPOWER TO BE REACHED
IN TWO PHASES WAS WITHOUT ANY CONNECTION WHATEVER TO REDUC-
TION OF ARMAMENTS.

17. FRG REP SAID ALLIED PROPOSAL WAS INDEED FOR COMMON CEILING
IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER TAKING ACCOUNT OF COMBAT CAPABILITIES.
HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND EASTERN REMARKS. WOULD THE EAST WISH A
COMMON CEILING ON TANKS OR A COMMON CEILING ON ARMAMENTS?

18. SOVIET REP SAID WEST WAS SUGGESTING REDUCING MANPOWER
TO A CERTAIN AGREED FIGURE ON BOTH SIDES FOR WHICH THE WEST
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PAGE 01 VIENNA 02071 03 OF 12 081645Z

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 IO-14

OIC-04 AECE-00 AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 12 VIENNA 2071

FROM US REP MBFR

WOULD ACCEPT THIS APPROACH, FROM WHICH WEST IN ADDITION EXCLUDED AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. EASTERN REPS HAD POINTED OUT THAT MILITARY LEADERS ON BOTH SIDES HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL EVENTUALITIES AND TO REACT ACCORDINGLY, SOMETIMES INCREASING GROUND FORCES AND SOMETIMES INCREASING AIR OR NUCLEAR FORCES. THE WEST HAD INCREASED NUCLEAR CAPACITY IN RECENT YEARS. ACCORDING TO RECENT REPORTS, THE WEST INTENDED TO INCREASE THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES STILL FURTHER IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WESTERN APPROACH WAS NEITHER FAIR NOR REALISTIC. WESTERN REPS WISHED TO INCREASE WESTERN SECURITY. THIS WAS A NATURAL DESIRE, BUT NOT AT THE COST OF DIMINISHING SECURITY OF OTHERS.

23. SMIRNOVSKY CONTINUED THAT, IN THE EASTERN PROPOSALS, NO ASPECT OF THE ARMED FORCES WAS EXCLUDED. IF A COUNTRY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 02071 03 OF 12 081645Z

HAD MORE GROUND FORCES, IT WOULD REDUCE MORE GROUND FORCES. IF IT HAD MORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IT WOULD REDUCE MORE OF THEM. SERIOUS MINDED EXPERTS WHO HAD THOUGHT ABOUT THIS PROBLEM FOR SOME YEARS HAD CONCLUDED THAT THIS WAS THE ONLY FEASIBLE WAY TO GO ABOUT IT. BUT THE WEST WISHED TO STRENGTHEN ITS SECURITY AT A COST TO THE EAST. THESE WERE THE REASONS WHY THE EAST CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT ALL FORCE ELEMENTS BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THE EAST COULD NOT ACCEPT AN APPROACH IN ACTUALITY BASED ON DISPARITIES UNDER THE QUISE OF A COMMON CEILING. IF THE WEST WOULD MAKE THE REDUCTIONS THE EAST HAD SUGGESTED, THERE WOULD BE CEILINGS.

24. FRG REP SAID EASTERN ASSUMPTION THAT THERE WAS ONLY A FIXED AMOUNT OF SECURITY AVAILABLE AND THAT AN INCREASE IN THE SECURITY OF ONE SIDE THEREFORE MEANT A DECREASE IN THE SECURITY OF THE OTHER WAS ERRONEOUS. WEST WANTED INCREASED SECURITY FOR BOTH SIDES. THERE WOULD BE MORE SECURITY FOR BOTH SIDES IF AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON THE COMMON CEILING. THE EAST SHOULD NOT TRY TO PRESERVE ITS PRESENT ONE-SIDED ADVANTAGE.

25. SMIRNOVSKY REPLIED THAT THE WEST WAS TRYING TO CHANGE THE EXISTING CORRELATION OF FORCES. ALLIED REPS SAID THIS WAS INDEED THE CASE. A CHANGE WAS NEEDED IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A MORE STABLE BASIS FOR EAST-WEST MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. GDR REP SAID THESE REMARKS PROVED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONSIDER GROUND FORCES IN ISOLATION. FRG REP SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO GET INTO THE TOPIC ON THIS OCCASION, BUT IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE EAST TOO HAD NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE AREA.

26. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS NOT UNSTABLE, AS WEST CLAIMED. HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT EASTERN OBJECTIVE TO PRESERVE THAT SITUATION INTACT. EAST WAS PREPARED TO REDUCE ALL FORCES ON EACH SIDE. IF ALL PARTICIPANTS PARTICIPATED IN INITIAL REDUCTIONS, PERHAPS IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE AFTERWARD TO MOVE TO MORE FAR-REACHING MEASURES. HOW WOULD THE WEST REACT TO AN UNFAIR PROPOSAL LIKE THE COMMON CIELING FOR GROUND FORCES IF THE EAST-WEST GROUND FORCE RELATIONSHIP WERE REVERSED AND THE WEST HAD TO TAKE A FAR LARGER REDUCTION THAN THE EAST, IN AN APPROACH WHERE SOME OF THE EASTERN COUNTRIES WERE NOT EVEN PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE ANYTHING? ON THE OTHER HAND, NO ONE'S SECURITY WOULD BE DIMINISHED IF THE PARTICIPANTS MADE A
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PAGE 03 VIENNA 02071 03 OF 12 081645Z

SYMBOLIC START.

27. FRG REP SAID PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WAS NOT A FAVORABLE ONE. THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NOT A STATE OF WAR WAS NOT THE SAME AS STABILITY. SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE EAST WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO SECURITY. BUT IN AGREEING TO THEM, WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE CERTIFYING THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WHICH WOULD THEREBY BE MAINTAINED. KHLESTOV RETORTED THAT SEVERAL WESTERN LEADERS HAD THEMSELVES COMMENTED THAT THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN EUROPE WAS A STABLE ONE. FRG REP SAID IT WAS NOT PRODUCTIVE IN HIS VIEW TO ENGAGE IN COMPETITION OF QUOTATIONS. HE COULD READILY QUOTE WARSAW PACT LEADERS WHO INSISTED THAT THE PACT HAD A LARGE MARGIN OF SUPERIORITY OVER THE WEST.

28. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THE ALLIES CLAIMED EAST WANTED THE WEST TO CERTIFY THAT WEST APPROVED THE PRESENT BALANCE OF FORCES. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. THE EAST WANTED TO REDUCE FORCES IN A WAY WHICH WOULD BE EQUITABLE FOR EACH SIDE, SO THAT NO ONE'S SECURITY WOULD BE DIMINISHED. SOME MIGHT SAY OF THIS PROCESS THAT IT AMOUNTED TO CERTIFYING THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES. BUT IN ACTUAL FACT, EUROPEAN SECURITY WOULD BE STRENGTHENED. THERE WOULD BE AN IMPROVED POLITICAL CLIMATE FOR FURTHER MEASURES. HE WAS SURPRISED THAT ALLIED REPS USED THE ARGUMENT THAT THE EAST WAS TRYING TO GET THE WEST TO CERTIFY AN UNSTABLE SITUATION. THE EAST WAS NOT ASKING THE WEST TO CERTIFY THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE EAST AGREED THE

PRESENT SITUATION COULD BE IMPROVED. THE PARTICIPANTS SHOULD GET ON WITH THE JOB. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT ALL FORCES BE REDUCED. THE COMMON CEILING WAS ONLY A REFLECTION OF WESTERN IDEAS ON INEQUITABLE REDUCTIONS.

29. FRG REP SAID THAT IF EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THEIR SYMBOLIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL TO BE A FIRST STEP, WOULD THE LONG-RANGE OUTCOME BE A COMMON CEILING? SMIRNOVSKY SAID ALLIED REPS MADE TOO MUCH OF THE COMMON CEILING AND THEIR CLAIM THAT REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT MAKE SENSE UNLESS THERE WAS A COMMON CEILING. WESTERN EUROPEAN REPS OPPOSED INDIVIDUAL CEILINGS FOR EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO PROTECT THEIR CAPACITY FOR DEFENSE COOPERATION. THE EAST WOULD NOT COMMENT NOW ON WHEN AND HOW THERE WOULD BE A COMMON CONCEPT OF DEFENSE FOR THE WESTERN EUROPEAN

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PAGE 04 VIENNA 02071 03 OF 12 081645Z

COUNTRIES. THIS WAS ANOTHER SUBJECT. BUT, IT WAS NOT A MATTER OF INDIFFERENCE FOR THE EAST AS TO WHICH COUNTRY MIGHT INCREASE ITS FORCES WITHIN SOME WESTERN GLOBAL CEILING WHILE ANOTHER REDUCED ITS FORCES.

30. POLISH REP SAID FRG REP CLAIMED COMMON CEILING WAS AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED WITH REGARD TO THE REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. IT WAS NOT AT ALL CLEAR FROM THE WESTERN PROPOSALS WHETHER SOME PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE AND OTHERS INCREASE THEIR FORCES UNDER THE COMMON CEILING. AND WHAT ASSURANCE DID THE COMMON CEILING GIVE WITH REGARD TO THE PROBLEM OF INCREASING OTHER FORCES IN THE MEANWHILE BETWEEN THE PHASES? APPARENTLY THE ALLIED VIEW WAS IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER THIS QUESTION ONLY IF THE EAST PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED THE PHASED APPROACH INCLUDING THE COMMON CEILING.

31. US REP SAID APPARENTLY THE REAL DIFFICULTY EAST HAD WITH COMMON CEILING WAS THE POSSIBILITY THAT IT LEFT FREEDOM FOR SOME FORCES TO INCREASE AND OTHERS

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 02071 04 OF 12 081548Z

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 IO-14

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USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 12 VIENNA 2071

TO DECREASE UNDER IT. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THIS WAS NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM RAISED BY THE COMMON CEILING, BUT IT WAS A DEFINITE PROBLEM. STRULAK SAID EASTERN REPS HAD BEEN TOLD THUS FAR ONLY WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO US FORCES AND NOT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO OTHER WESTERN FORCES. GDR REP SAID ALLIES COULD NEGOTIATE ON PHASE II FOR 10 YEARS. THESE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT NEVER COME TO AN OUTCOME. AN OBLIGATION TO REACH A COMMON CEILING MEANT NOTHING.

32. US REP SAID ALLIES HAD INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO START NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD, AND TO NEGOTIATE ON THE LENGTH OF THAT PERIOD, AND ALSO TO UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT IN THE FIRST PHASE
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PAGE 02 VIENNA 02071 04 OF 12 081548Z

REGARDING THE NUMERICAL OUTCOME OF THE SECOND PHASE. EASTERN REPS WERE OVEREMPHASIZING THE VAGUENESS OF THE ALLIED PROPOSAL. ALLIED REPS HAD INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO ENTER A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS.

33. FRG REP POINTED OUT THAT AN AGREEMENT UNDER THE ALLIED PROPOSAL WOULD EMBODY A DEFINITE COMMITMENT AS TO THE OUTCOME OF PHASE II. HE

REMARKED THAT EASTERN REPS HAD STILL NOT ANSWERED HIS ORIGINAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE COMMON CEILING AND ASKED FOR CLEARER RESPONSE. POLISH REP SAID HE COULD NOT ANSWER THIS QUESTION IN ISOLATION OUT OF CONTEXT OF THE DISCUSSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. GDR REP SAID THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEN AND WEAPONS SHOULD BE THE MAIN GUIDELINES. MEN AND EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE REDUCED BY THE SAME PERCENTAGE. THIS COULD BE DONE WITHOUT CHANGING THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES, AND THE EFFECTS ON EACH PARTICIPANT WOULD BE EQUITABLE. IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO REACH A REASONABLE OUTCOME ON THESE LINES BY SPEAKING ONLY OF GROUND FORCES. ALL THE QUESTIONS NOW POSED BY THE ALLIED REPS COULD ONLY BE ANSWERED PROPERLY WHEN IT WAS REALIZED THAT ALL COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES WERE INTER-RELATED. PROPORTIONATE REDUCTIONS OF EACH FORCE ELEMENT WOULD MAINTAIN THE PRESENT STABLE SITUATION. A COMMON CEILING IN MANPOWER WOULD NOT CREATE PARITY. IT WAS ONLY A SPECIAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EAST TO REDUCE MORE.

34. US REP SAID THAT FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES, THE PRESENT SUBJECT MATTER WAS LIMITED TO GROUND FORCES. AGAIN FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES, ONE COULD ASSUME THEORETICALLY THAT NO AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES EXISTED. IN THIS HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION, WOULD NOT A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCES BE FAIR WAY TO EQUATE THE FORCES OF BOTH SIDES? IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT GROUND FORCES WERE OVER 80 PERCENT OF FORCES IN THE AREA. IN DESTINCTION TO AIR FORCES, THEY WERE SLOW AND MORE CUMBERSOME TO MOVE IN
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 02071 04 OF 12 081548Z

AND OUT. IT WOULD MAKE A LOT OF SENSE TO HAVE PARITY IN THE LARGEST NUMBER OF FORCES IN THE AREA. IF ONE WERE TO CONCEPTUALLY LEAVE ASIDE THE OTHER ELEMENTS, WOULD IT NOT BE FAIR AND EQUITABLE AS REGARDS AGREEMENT INTENDED TO LAST FOR DECADES TO USE THE GROUND SOLDIER AS THE MEASUREMENT? THE OUTCOME WOULD BE FAIR AND STABLE. NEITHER SIDE COULD BE THE VICTIM OF ATTACK BY THE OTHER. ONE SHOULD JUDGE THIS PROPOSITION ON ITS OWN MERITS.

35. GDR REP SAID HE HAD BEEN TAUGHT NOT TO ANSWER HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS. ALLIED REPS MUST BE AWARE THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF ARMED FORCES ARE INTER-CONNECTED. THE COMMON CEILING APPROACH WOULD NOT LEAD PARTICIPANTS FORWARD TO A FINAL PRODUCTIVE OUTCOME. INSTEAD, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD DISCUSS A

SYMBOLIC REDUCTION OF ALL FORCES FROM THE OUTSET.

36. FRG REP SAID EASTERN REPS OBJECTED TO A COMMON CEILING LIMITED TO MANPOWER. DID THEY HAVE IN MIND PARITY OF SOME EQUIPMENT ON EACH SIDE? SMIRNOVSKY RETORTED THAT ALLIED REPS CLAIMED THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT A SYMBOLIC REDUCTION BECAUSE IT WOULD SANCTIFY THE PRESENT UNEQUAL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES AND WAS THEREFORE INEQUITABLE. BUT THE WESTERN IDEA OF UNEQUAL REDUCTIONS WAS ALSO UNEQUITABLE.

37. CANADIAN REP ASKED SOVIET REP WHETHER HE HAD NOT, DURING LAST SESSION, MADE A PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD HAVE OBIATED THE NEED FOR NATIONAL CEILINGS. KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT ON PRESENT OCCASION HE HAD BEEN GIVING GENERAL SOVIET VIEWS AS REGARDS CEILINGS. ON THE LAST SESSION, HE HAD MERELY BEEN GIVING SOME POSSIBLE TRIAL IDEAS. ON THAT OCCASION HE HAD NOTED THE WESTERN APPROACH WAS NOT PRODUCTIVE AND THAT, INSTEAD, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TRY TO EXAMINE FURTHER THE POSITION OF BOTH SIDES. HE HAD NOTED THAT THE SECOND PHASE OF ALLIED POSITION WAS UNCLEAR, AND HE HAD ASKED A QUESTION ABOUT IT. HE HAD ALSO ADVANCED SOME THOUGHTS ON HOW TO FIND WAYS OF AVOIDING CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES, BUT THESE WERE IDEAS
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PAGE 04 VIENNA 02071 04 OF 12 081548Z

WITHOUT STATUS.

38. SMIRNOVSKY SAID EASTERN REPS HAD BEEN TOLD THAT

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 02071 05 OF 12 081732Z

42

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 IO-14

OIC-04 AECE-00 AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00

CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04

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S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 12 VIENNA 2071

THEIR IDEA OF SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS POSED DIFFICULTIES AND HAD BEEN RESPONDING TO THAT POINT. IN THIS SENSE, EASTERN REPS HAD STATED ON PREVIOUS SESSION THAT, IF THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES, PERHAPS THERE WOULD BE A WAY TO DEAL WITH THEM. IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT KHLESTOV HAD MENTIONED THE IDEA OF OVERALL CEILINGS. FRG REP SAID ALLIES REPS APPRECIATED EASTERN EFFORT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED BY ALLIED REPS. BUT THEY CONTINUED TO OBJECT TO THE FACT THAT THE EASTERN APPROACH CONSECRATED THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES. IT WAS NOT AT ALL CRIMINAL TO PROPOSE CHANGING THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN ORDER TO OBTAIN MORE SECURITY FOR ALL.

39. DRAWING FROM TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY
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PAGE 02 VIENNA 02071 05 OF 12 081732Z

AD HOC GROUP, CANADIAN REP REVIEWED WESTERN ARGUMENTS WHY US AND SOVIETS SHOULD LEAD OFF AND WHY OTHER WESTERN DCIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT WISH TO PARTICIPATE FROM THE OUTSET. HE STATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, OWING TO THE SIZE OF THEIR MILITARY RESOURCES, AND THEIR STATUS AS MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS, HAD A PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRESERVING PEACE IN EUROPE AND FOR FACILITATING THE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS. REDUCTION OF THE FORCES BELONGING TO THE TWO MAJOR POWERS WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. AN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES WOULD CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIALLY TO IMPROVED RELATIONS BOTH

BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR AND THUS TO
REDUCTION OF TENSION IN EUROPE. IT HAD BEEN
SUGGESTED BY THE EASTERN SIDE THAT PARTICIPANTS TRY TO REACH
AGREEMENT BY 1975. IF SO, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD
SEEK OUT THE SIMPLEST AND MOST PRACTICAL APPROACH.
SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD MAXIMIZE THE CHANCES OF
REACHING AGREEMENT IN THE SHORTEST TIME. TO
DEAL WITH US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES FIRST
PROVIDED THE MEANS OF DOING THIS.

40. CANADIAN REP CONTINUED THAT REACHING AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL
OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES WOULD ENHANCE
MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AMONG ALL PARTICIPANTS.
PARTICIPANTS COULD THEN TACKLE IN A SECOND PHASE
OF NEGOTIATIONS THE MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEM ON
INCLUDING REDUCTIONS OF FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS. IT WOULD BE EASIER TO REACH
AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES THAN ON THEIR
REDUCTION. SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING PHASE I AGREEMENT
ON US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND THE COMMON CEILING
CONCEPT WOULD CREATE THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS OF
CONFIDENCE FOR OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE
THEIR FORCES. WITHDRAWAL OF A TANK ARMY WOULD
REDUCE ALLIED CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET FORCES IN
CENTRAL EUROPE. AND AGREEMENT TO WORK TOWARD
PARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WOULD ESTABLISH
AN APPROPRIATE GOAL.

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PAGE 03 VIENNA 02071 05 OF 12 081732Z

41. CANADIAN REP CONCLUDED THAT THE WAY TO REDUCTIONS
OF FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
LIES THROUGH US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS THE
ALLIES HAVE PROPOSED IN PHASE I. IF A SATISFACTORY
PHASE I AGREEMENT, INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON THE
CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING, COULD BE REACHED,
THE ALLIES WERE SURE THAT EASTERN INTEREST IN
ASSURING THAT REDUCTION OF OTHER ALLIED FORCES WILL
TAKE PLACE IN PHASE II COULD BE MET.

42. KHLESTOV ASKED CANADIAN REP WHY, IF IT WERE
ALL RIGHT FOR US AND USSR TO START THE REDUCTION
PROCESS, COULDN'T CANADA JOIN THEM? IF, AS CANADIAN
REP ARGUED, PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BE PLEASED IF
TWO COUNTRIES STATED THE

SECRET

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SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 02071 06 OF 12 081657Z

40

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 IO-14

OIC-04 AECE-00 AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 12 VIENNA 2071

FROM US REP MBFR

PROCESS, IT SHOULD STILL BE MORE PLEASED IF THREE COUNTRIES JOINED IN. WHAT WAS THE GREAT DIFFICULTY FOR CANADA TO DECIDE TO REDUCE? CANADIAN REP POINTED OUT THAT CANADA HAD ALREADY REDUCED ITS FORCES BY 50 PCT UNILATERALLY 4 TO 5 YEARS AGO.

43. SMIRNOVSKY SAID, WOULDN'T PUBLIC OPINION IN ALL COUNTRIES BE HAPPIER IF ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE. KHLESTOV SAID EVEN IF THE REDUCTIONS WERE 5,000 OR ONLY 500 MEN, WHY COULDN'T CANADA DO THIS? CANADIAN REP REPLIED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY THAT CONFIDENCE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO ACCEPT REDUCTIONS MUST BE BUILT UP IN THE MINDS OF WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION THROUGH A PRIOR DEMONSTRATION BY
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PAGE 02 VIENNA 02071 06 OF 12 081657Z

THE GREAT POWERS

TO ACCEPT THE RISK INVOLVED IN REDUCING FORCES. THAT
IS WHY US AND USSR SHOULD LEAD OFF.

44. SMIRNOVSKY AND GDR REP ASKED WHAT ABOUT PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
IN THEIR COUNTRIES. KHLESTOV ASKED WHY CANADA COULD NOT REDUCE
A FEW HUNDRED SOLDIERS. THE CANADIANS SHOULD BE IN FROM THE
OUTSET. FRG REP SAID THAT CANADA WAS A BAD EXAMPLE
FOR THE EASTERN CASE. A SMALL REDUCTION WAS NOT
SUFFICIENT. THERE WAS A NEED TO ESTABLISH
CONFIDENCE THROUGH A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION ON THE
PART OF THE TWO MAJOR POWERS. WESTERN EUROPE WOULD
THEN HAVE SUFFICIENT CONFIDENCE IN THE FINAL OUTCOME.
THIS WAS WHY EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON
CEILING WAS IMPORTANT.

45. US REP SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN MIND
THAT, FOR THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS,
ENTERING AN AGREEMENT COULD MEAN PUTTING A
CEILING AT LEAST ON THE TOTAL OF GROUND FORCE
ESTABLISHMENTS ON EACH SIDE. THIS WAS DIFFERENT
FOR WHAT WAS PROPOSED FOR THE US OR FOR THE SOVIETS.

46. EASTERN REPS SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT THE
SITUATION OF THOSE DIRECT PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES
WHOSE ENTIRE FORCES LIE WITHIN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS
WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE US AND USSR, WHO ONLY
HAVE A PORTION OF THEIR FORCES THERE. IN AGREEING
TO WITHDRAW FORCES FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, THE
US AND USSR WOULD ONLY PLACE LIMITATIONS ON THEIR
FREEDOM TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES IN THE AREA BUT
WOULD NOT OTHERWISE LIMIT THEIR OVERALL DEFENSE EFFORT.
IN OTHER WORDS, THE US AND USSR WOULD NOT BE
INVOLVING THE MILITARY FUTURE OF THEIR ENTIRE
GROUND FORCES IN AN AGREEMENT. THE CASE OF THE
WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WAS THE OPPOSITE
ONE. HENCE, THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
CONCERNED WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT REDUCTIONS
OF THEIR OVERALL GROUND FORCE POTENTIAL OR
LIMITATIONS ON THAT POTENTIAL ONCE REDUCTIONS
HAVE TAKEN PLACE, EVEN THOUGH THESE LIMITATIONS
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PAGE 03 VIENNA 02071 06 OF 12 081657Z

WOULD BE COLLECTIVE IN NATURE, EXCEPT IN
EXCHANGE FOR SOMETHING WHICH REPRESENTED A
GENUINELY SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR
SECURITY.

47. US REP CONTINUED THAT THESE COUNTRIES COULD

CONTEMPLATE SUCH A VITAL LIMITATION ON THEIR NATIONAL FUTURE ONLY IF THEY COULD ASSURE THEMSELVES IN ADVANCE THAT THE PROCESS TO WHICH THEY WILL BE COMMITTING THEMSELVES WOULD IN FACT ENHANCE THEIR SECURITY, FIRST, THROUGH AGREEMENT THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, AND SECOND, THROUGH PRIOR REDUCTIONS BY THE US AND USSR.

48. POLISH REP SAID THAT THE EASTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND EAST GERMANY, WOULD BE IN THE SAME POSITION AS THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES REFERRED TO BY THE US REP. THE FUTURE AGREEMENTS WOULD COVER THE WHOLE OF THEIR NATIONAL TERRITORY AND THEIR ENTIRE ARMED FORCES. THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF THESE THREE COUNTRIES WAS IN MANY WAYS LESS THAN THAT OF THE WESTERN PART OF THE AREA. SO SUCH LIMITATIONS WOULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT MEANING FOR THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS. NONETHELESS, THEY WERE READY TO AGREE, BECAUSE, OF ALL REDUCED, THIS WOULD BE THE GUARANTEE OF THE CONTINUATION OF A PROCESS WHICH COULD BRING IMPORTANT POLITICAL RESULTS AND ECONOMIC ONES AS WELL. THERE WOULD BE A QUID PRO QUO FOR ALL. MOREOVER, THE WESTERN PROPOSALS FOR REDUCTIONS DID NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF POLISH SECURITY. IN FACT, POLAND'S SECURITY WOULD BE DISADVANTAGED THROUGH IT. US REP SAID HE STILL COULD NOT SEE HOW EASTERN SECURITY WOULD BE DIMINISHED IF AFTER REDUCTIONS THE EAST WOULD STILL HAVE ABOUT 2.5 TIMES THE NUMBER OF TANKS THE WEST HAD AND 120,000 MORE GROUND FORCES.

49. KHLESTOV SAID A MORE PRACTICAL APPROACH SHOULD BE TAKEN. IF THE TOTAL OF FORCES ON EACH SIDE WERE
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PAGE 04 VIENNA 02071 06 OF 12 081657Z

TAKEN AND 20,000 WERE REDUCED FROM EACH SIDE, THIS WOULD BE A GREAT REDUCTION. IF THIS WERE DONE WITHOUT NATIONAL CEILINGS, AS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE THE FREEDOM TO CHANGE WITHIN ITS OWN TOTAL, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD ASSUME THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, NONE WOULD WISH TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF THEIR GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT IF WESTERN FORCES WERE X, X MINUS 20,000 WOULD BE THE NEW LIMIT FOR THE WEST AND IF EASTERN FORCES WERE Y, Y MINUS 20,000 WOULD BE THE NEW LIMIT FOR THE EAST. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD AVOID THEORETICAL DIFFICULTIES ABOUT EVALUATING THE FORCES ON BOTH SIDES. THIS PROCEDURE WOULD ESTABLISH NEW LIMITS FOR A FIXED PERIOD, PERHAPS A YEAR

OR TWO. THIS WOULD GIVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 02071 07 OF 12 081722Z

40

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 IO-14

OIC-04 AECE-00 AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00

CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

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S E C R E T SECTION 7 OF 12 VIENNA 2071

HOW TO REDUCE FURTHER. THIS WOULD BUILD CONFIDENCE
AND UNDERSTANDING.

50. FRG REP SAID THAT THE TROUBLE WAS THAT Y WAS LARGER
THAN X. THIS MEANT THAT THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES
WOULD BE CHANGED TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE EAST IF THIS
RELATIONSHIP WERE USED AS THE BASIS FOR REDUCTIONS.
KHLESTOV SAID THAT IF THE 20,000 FIGURE CAUSED DIFFICULTY,
THEN PARTICIPANTS SHOULD THINK ABOUT EQUAL PERCENTAGE
REDUCTIONS INSTEAD OF A FIGURE OF 20,000, PERHAPS ONLY ONE
OR TWO PERCENT. ONE PERCENT WOULD ONLY MEAN 7,700 SOLDIERS
ACCORDING TO WESTERN CALCULATIONS OF THEIR OWN FORCE TOTALS.

51. FRG REP SAID THAT BOTH PERCENTAGES OR EQUAL NUMBERS
CREATED THE SAME DIFFICULTIES IF ONE WERE STARTING FROM

THE PRESENT FORCE RELATIONSHIP. KHLESTOV SAID IN THAT
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PAGE 02 VIENNA 02071 07 OF 12 081722Z

EVENT, ONE COULD INCLUDE IN THE AGREEMENT A PROVISION STATING THAT IT WOULD NOT ESTABLISH A PRECEDENT FOR FURTHER REDUCTIONS. US REP SAID THAT, EVEN UNDER A GLOBAL TOTAL FOR EACH SIDE, THE POINT HE HAD RAISED ABOUT THE CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE WILLINGNESS OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO ENTER WOULD STILL PERTAIN. FRG REP SAID EITHER EQUAL NUMBER OR EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS CREATED THE SAME DIFFICULTIES FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS. SMIRNOVSKY ASKED WHY SHOULD IT BE ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS WHEN EASTERN EUROPEANS WERE WILLING TO GO INTO THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT?

52. FRG REP COMMENTED THAT WHAT CAME AFTERWARD IN EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS TOO VAGUE. WOULD THE PROPOSAL LEAD TO A COMMON CEILING? STRULAK SAID THAT ALLIED EFFORTS TO MAKE ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING A PRECONDITION FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS MADE IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT THE ALLIED APPROACH. FRG REP SAID IT WAS STILL MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE WEST TO ACCEPT THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES AS THE BASIS FOR REDUCTIONS. STRULAK SAID THE EAST WOULD NOT BIND THE WEST TO THIS INTERPRETATION. US REP SAID THAT, IN PRACTICE, IT WOULD MEAN ACCEPTANCE OF THIS BASIS, WHATEVER MIGHT BE SAID OF THIS POINT IN AN AGREEMENT. KHLESTOV REPEATED HIS PROPOSAL THAT THERE BE A CLAUSE THAT REDUCTIONS UNDER THIS CONCEPT WOULD NOT PREJUDICE OR BE AUTOMATICALLY CONSIDERED A PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE REDUCTIONS. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS KIND COULD BE AVOIDED IN AN AGREEMENT. CANADIAN REP SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WANTED A REAL CONTRIBUTION THROUGH MEANINGFUL REDUCTIONS. SMIRNOVSKY SAID PARTICIPANTS SHOULD MAKE JUST A START TO SHOW A BEGINNING. THE ONLY POSSIBLE BASIS FOR REDUCTIONS WAS AN EQUAL BASIS. KHLESTOV SAID ALLIES COULD ALWAYS CLAIM THAT A COMMON CEILING EXISTED AND EVERYONE WOULD BE HAPPY.

53. FRG REP SAID EASTERN SUGGESTIONS OF AN OVERALL CEILING ON MANPOWER FOR EACH SIDE WITHIN THE AREA, COMBINED WITH LIMITATIONS ON ENTRY OF US AND SOVIET FORCES INTO THE AREA WERE CONCEPTS WHICH MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO RETAIN FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION. THIS COULD BE A USEFUL
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PAGE 03 VIENNA 02071 07 OF 12 081722Z

APPROACH FOR PHASE II. KHLESTOV ASKED WHY UK
AND CANADA COULD NOT PARTICIPATE FROM THE OUT-
SET. SMIRNOVSKY SAID EASTERN REPS HOPED ALLIES
WOULD CONSIDER THE APPROACH THE EAST HAD
RECOMMENDED FOR APPLICATION NOW AND NOT MERELY
FLOAT IT OFF TO PHASE II.

54. US REP, USING TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY
THE AD HOC GROUP, SAID AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, A
NUMBER OF POINTS RAISED BY KHLESTOV IN THE
MARCH 4 SESSION APPEARED TO HAVE A BEARING ON
PHASING.

55. FOR EXAMPLE, US REP CONTINUED, KHLESTOV'S REMARK THAT ON
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PAGE 01 VIENNA 02071 08 OF 12 081742Z

42
ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 IO-14

OIC-04 AECE-00 AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00

CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

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S E C R E T SECTION 8 OF 12 VIENNA 2071

FROM US REP MBFR

THE QUESTION DID ARISE AS TO WHAT TO DO ABOUT
OTHER FORCES IN THE AREA. OF COURSE, THE QUESTION
WAS BASED ON AN ASSUMPTION WHICH WAS NOT ACCEPTED
BY THE EAST. US REP SAID THAT ONE IDEA PUT FORWARD IN
THE LAST SESSION WAS TO START WITH FORCES FROM
OUTSIDE THE AREA; IN THIS THEORETICAL EVENT EAST

HAD ASKED ABOUT LIMIT ON MANPOWER OF OTHER FORCES IN AREA. SUCH A LIMITATION SHOULD BE GLOBAL IN NATURE IF CONSIDERED AT ALL. HOWEVER, HE WAS NOT ADDRESSING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE IDEA, BUT TRYING TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IT WAS BASED ON AN IMPLICIT ASSUMPTION THAT THERE WOULD BE SUCCESSIVE STAGES OF NEGOTIATION.

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PAGE 02 VIENNA 02071 08 OF 12 081742Z

58. KHLESTOV SAID THAT HE HAD NOT IMAGINED THIS IDEA AS LEADING TO TWO PHASES OF REDUCTION. AFTER FURTHER THOUGHT, KHLESTOV THEN SAID HE "HAD NOT HEARD" THIS IDEA ON THE LAST OCCASION. HE HAD HEARD ANOTHER IDEA, TO THINK OF REDUCTIONS OF FOREIGN TROOPS, BUT SIMULTANEOUSLY TO THINK OF SOME MEASURE WHICH WOULD PREVENT INCREASES OF MANPOWER WITHIN THE AREA. NO IDEA OF STAGES HAD BEEN INVOLVED. US REP EXPLAINED ALLIED QUESTION ONCE MORE. KHLESTOV REPLIED THAT THE ISSUE DID NOT SEEM A REAL ONE, SINCE AN AGREEMENT ACCORDING TO THE EASTERN APPROACH WOULD PROVIDE THAT NO COUNTRY WITHIN THE AREA WOULD EXCEED THE NATIONAL CEILING. US REP SAID HE WAS REFERRING TO SOVIET REP'S THOUGHT IN PREVIOUS SESSION ABOUT ESTABLISHING GLOBAL CEILINGS FOR EACH SIDE IN THE AREA IN CONNECTION WITH SYMBOLIC REDUCTION IDEA. HE DID NOT WISH TO COMMENT AS TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE IDEA, BUT THIS CONCEPT TOO SEEMED TO APPLY AN INITIAL PHASE OF REDUCTION OF FORCES FROM OUTSIDE THE AREA FOLLOWED BY IMPLEMENTATION AND THEN BY A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITING FORCES. ALLIES WERE NOT SO MUCH INTERESTED IN THE SUBSTANCE AS IN THE CONCEPT OF THE STAGING INVOLVED. SOVIET REP HAD PUT OUT TWO IDEAS IN PREVIOUS SESSION. BOTH SEEMED TO INVOLVE THE IDEA OF TWO SUCCESSFUL STAGES OF NEGOTIATION.

59. KHLESTOV SAID EAST DID NOT HAVE A CONCEPT OF PHASING OF NEGOTIATIONS. EASTERN REPS HAD A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO THIS PROBLEM. EASTERN REPS HAD MEANT THAT WHILE THE SYMBOLIC AGREEMENT WAS BEING IMPLEMENTED, PARTICIPANTS COULD CONTINUE WITH FURTHER NEGOTIATION. EASTERN REPS DID NOT CONSIDER THAT NEGOTIATIONS THEY HAD IN MIND WERE IN PHASES, THEY WERE CONTEMPLATING ONE UNINTERRUPTED NEGOTIATION. AS TO US REP'S REMARK ABOUT APPROVAL BY GOVERNMENTS PRIOR TO A SECOND ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR NATIONAL FORCES, HE COULD NOT ANSWER THIS QUESTION SINCE EASTERN REPS HAD NOT THOUGHT IT OVER. WOULD RATIFICATION CAUSE A PROBLEM FOR WESTERN COUNTRIES?

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PAGE 03 VIENNA 02071 08 OF 12 081742Z

60. US REP SAID GOVERNMENT APPROVAL OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS WOULD BE A NECESSITY. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS WOULD REQUIRE FORMAL RATIFICATION OR NOT. AS PERSONAL VIEWPOINT, IF AN AGREEMENT WAS CONFINED TO WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES PERHAPS IT COULD GO INTO EFFECT WHEN APPROVED BY THE TWO PARTIES WHO ACTUALLY HAD TO WITHDRAW FORCES, ALTHOUGH OTHER PARTICIPANTS WOULD PROBABLY BE SIGNATORIES AND THEIR GOVERNMENTS TOO WOULD HAVE TO APPROVE. KHLESTOV SAID NEGOTIATIONS COULD CONTINUE WHILE AWAITING APPROVAL ON RATIFICATION BY GOVERNMENTS. EAST DID NOT HAVE CONCEPT OF PHASES. IT WOULD REGARD SYMBOLIC REDUCTION AS FIRST RESULT OF CONTINUING NEGOTIATING PROCESS. U.S. REP COMMENTED THAT EASTERN REPS APPARENTLY CONTEMPLATED IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR PROPOSED SYMBOLIC REDUCTION BEFORE DISCUSSION ON THE NEXT ROUND WAS FINISHED. KHLESTOV RESPONDED THAT, AFTER ALL, PRESENT CONFERENCE ALREADY EMBODIED STAGES OF NEGOTIATION FIRST, THERE HAD BEEN SESSIONS UP TILL MID-DECEMBER. NOW THERE WOULD BE ONE TO MID-APRIL AND SO ON.

61. FRG REP SAID CONCLUSION HE DREW FROM THIS DISCUSSION WAS THAT EAST WOULD GO SO FAR AS TO CONCLUDE THE FIRST STAGE AGREEMENT AND START IMPLEMENTATION PRIOR TO BEGINNING OF SECOND STAGE OF NEGOTIATION. KHLESTOV SAID ALLIED REPS SHOULD NOT WASTE THEIR TIME TRYING TO INTERPRET EASTERN IDEAS AS BEING IN AGREEMENT WITH WESTERN IDEAS OF PHASES. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. FRG REP SAID KHLESTOV WAS SPEAKING OF REDUCTION OF SOME FORCES FIRST AND OTHERS LATER. HE MUST IN FACT BE THINKING OF PHASES OF NEGOTIATION OR THE WHOLE THING DIDN'T MAKE SENSE. US REP SAID SMIRNOVSKY APPEARED TO THINK THAT IF THE FIRST ROUND WERE AGREED ON, PARTICIPANTS COULD START
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PAGE 01 VIENNA 02071 09 OF 12 081800Z

44

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 IO-14

OIC-04 AECE-00 AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 9 OF 12 VIENNA 2071

FROM US REP MBFR

ABOUT STARTING WITH ALL FORCES FROM OUTSIDE AREA HAD
NEGATIVE ASPECTS FOR ALLIES SINCE IT WOULD ESTABLISH DIVISION
AMONG WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. LIKE EASTERN TERMINOLOGY DIVIDING
PARTICIPANTS INTO "FOEIGN" AND "NATIONAL" FORCES, WHICH WEST
WAS ALSO NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT FOR COMMON USE, THIS
DISTINCTION WAS NOT A "PRODUCTIVE" ONE FOR WEST AS THE TERM
PRODUCTIVE WAS USED HERE. THE ONLY DISTINCTION WITHIN THE GROUP
OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WHICH THE WEST FOR ITS PART WAS PREPARED
TO ACCEPT FOR COMMON USE WAS BETWEEN "US AND SOVIET FORCES"
AND "FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS." THIS WAS A DIS-
TINCTION WHICH HAD A GENERAL MILITARY AND POLITICAL JUSTIFI-
CATION. ANY PROPOSALS BASED ON ANY OTHER DISTINCTION, FOR EXAMPLE
ONE WHICH HAS THE EFFECT OF TREATING THE UK AS BELONGING TO
A SEPARATE GROUP FROM ITS PARTNERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,
WAS IN ALLIED VIEW UNREALISTIC AND DID NOT CORRESPOND TO POLITICAL

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PAGE 02 VIENNA 02071 09 OF 12 081800Z

DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE.

63. KHLESTOV SAID THESE REMARKS MEANT WEST HAD CHANGED ITS
OWN TERMINOLOGY. PREVIOUSLY WESTERN OFFICIALS HAD REFERRED TO
FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES. SMIRNOVSKY SAID HE HAD HAD MANY
DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON ON FORCE REDUCTIONS WITH UK OFFICIALS IN
WHICH LATTER HAD REPEATEDLY REFERRED TO REDUCTIONS OF "NATIONAL"
AND FOREIGN" FORCES IN SO MANY WORDS. FRG REP SAID THAT NATO
HAD EARLIER RESPONDED TO SOVIET EMPHASIS ON REDUCTION OF
OUTSIDE FORCES ALONE BY INSISTING THAT NATIONAL FORCES SHOULD
ALSO BE INCLUDED IN THE REDUCTION PROGRAM. KHLESTOV CLAIMED
THIS POINT DEMONSTRATED WEST HAD CHANGED ITS POSITION SINCE.
ALLIED REPS SAID THIS WAS NOT SO. THE OPEN ISSUE WAS
WHETHER EUROPEAN FORCES SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET.

64. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THE RESULT OF THESE ALLIED REMARKS AS
FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED WAS THAT THE WHOLE WESTERN POINT
BECAME ILLOGICAL. ALLIED REPS HAD JUST MADE THE POINT THAT

WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WITHIN THE AREA WOULD HAVE PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES IN PARTICIPATING IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. BUT ALLIED REPS NOW WANTED TO LUMP GREAT BRITAIN, WHOSE FORCES WERE OUTSIDE THE AREA AND THEREFORE WHO WOULD NOT BE EXPOSED TO THE LIMITATIONS CITED, IN THIS GROUP. BUT THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE HERE. BRITISH FORCES WERE OUTSIDE. FRG REP SAID IT WAS NOT A MATTER OF LOGIC, BUT A POLITICAL FACT OF UK MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT, IN THAT EVENT, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD CONSIDER A NATIONAL CEILING FOR THE ENTIRE UK FORCES.

65. KHLESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO ANSWER REMARKS MADE BY THE CANADIAN REP. THE POINTS MADE BY THE CANADIAN REP WERE UNNECESSARY AND WOULD FRUSTRATE THE NEGOTIATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, FROM POINT OF VIEW OF LOGIC AND GEOGRAPHIC CRITERIA, ALL UK FORCES IN THE AREA WERE OUTSIDE FORCES. PAGE 20 OF THE RECENT FRG DEFENSE WHITE PAPER SHOWED A NEAT DIVISION BETWEEN FOREIGN FORCES STATED IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND NATIONAL FORCES. THIS DISTINCTION HAS ALSO BEEN SHOWN IN ALL PREVIOUS DOCUMENTS. FROM ANY VIEWPOINT WHATEVER, A NATURAL DISTINCTION COULD BE MADE BETWEEN NATIONAL FORCES AND FOREIGN FORCES. ALLIED REPS WERE NOW SEEKING TO DIVIDE FORCES IN ANOTHER WAY, US AND SOVIET FORCES ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE FORCES OF OTHER

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SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 02071 09 OF 12 081800Z

DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE OTHER HAND. ALLIED OBJECTIVES COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED THROUGH COINING NEW TERMINOLOGY. THIS EFFORT CREATED DIFFICULTIES FOR TERMINOLOGY ALREADY DEVELOPED AND ACCEPTED.

66. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT THESE CHANGES IN TERMINOLOGY PROPOSED BY ALLIED REPS CREATED UNNECESSARY DIFFICULTIES AND EVEN A CERTAIN SURPRISE. HE DID NOT CONSIDER THIS A SOLID AND SERIOUS WAY OF ARGUING FOR THE ALLIED POSITION. THE ALLIES SHOULD USE MORE SOLID AND LOGICAL ARGUMENTS. CHANGES IN THE ALLIED TERMINOLOGY WOULD NOT MAKE THE ALLIED POSITION ANY MORE ATTRACTIVE TO THE EAST OR CHANGE ANYTHING.

67. CANADIAN REP SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT ALLIED REPS HAD RAISED THIS ISSUE BECAUSE KHLESTOV HAD INITIATED DISCUSSION ON POSSIBLE FIRST STAGE OF REDUCTION OF FORCES FROM OUTSIDE THE AREA. ALLIES HAD WANTED TO INDICATE THROUGH THEIR REMARKS THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE SUBSTANCE OF KHLESTOV'S IDEA.

68. FRG REP SAID THAT EASTERN REPS HAD ASSERTED PREVIOUS AND ALSO IN PRESENT SESSIONS THAT ALLIED REPS HAD NOT MADE ANY SUBSTANTIAL STATEMENTS ABOUT PHASE II. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, HE THOUGHT IT USEFUL TO SUMMARIZE ONCE MORE WHAT ALLIES HAD SAID ON THIS TOPIC. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HC GROUP, FRG REP SAID THE ALLIES HAD MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS ABOUT PHASE II AND THE PARTICIPATION OF

DIRECT PARTICIPANTS: THE ALLIES HAD PROPOSED A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AS THE OVERALL REDUCTION GOAL TO BE REACHED IN TWO PHASES. THE ALLIES HAD GIVEN THE OVERALL DIMENSIONS OF THE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED FOR BOTH FORCES BY SUGGESTING THAT THE COMMON CEILING BE SET AT 700,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE. ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES AHD STATED THAT, ON THE ALLIED SIDE, PHASE II REDUCTIONS WOULD CONCENTRATE ON FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS NOTINVOLVED IN THE REDUCTIONS ENVISAGED IN THE ALLIED PHASE I PROPOSAL, AND THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE COMMON CEILING. THE ALLIES HAD SAID PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD CONTAIN A PROVISION CONTAINING A COMMITMENT TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. AT LAST INFORMAL SESSION, ALLIED REPS GAVE EAST FURTHER CLARIFICATION AS TO THIS PROVISION. ALLIED REPS HAD TOLD EASTERN REPS SECOND-PHASE NEGOTIATIONS COULD START "WITHIN A FIXED

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SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENNA 02071 09 OF 12 081800Z

PERIOD OF TIME" AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 02071 10 OF 12 081712Z

45

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 IO-14

OIC-04 AECE-00 AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00

CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

SAM-01 /147 W

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1909

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 10 OF 12 VIENNA 2071

CONCEPT. THE DURATION OF THIS FIXED PERIOD WOULD BE AGREED LATER IN THE COURSE OF THE PHASE ONE NEGOTIATIONS DURING DISCUSSION OF THE PROVISION ALREADY REFERRED TO. THIS WAS A SIGNIFICANT POINT. ALL IN ALL, THESE POINTS PROVIDED A COMPREHENSIVE PICTURE.

69. FRG REP CONTINUED THAT ALLIES HAD ONE FURTHER POINT TO MAKE ON THIS TOPIC. WITH REGARD TO REPEATED EASTERN QUESTIONS ABOUT FURTHER ASSURANCES CONCERNING WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II, ALLIES WERE NOT PREPARED TO CONSIDER MAKING FURTHER COMMITMENTS BEYOND WHAT THEY HAD ALREADY TOLD EAST REGARDING WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF EQUIVALENT EASTERN COMMITMENTS TO ALLIES PROPOSED COMMON CEILING AS THE OUTCOME OF PHASE II.

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PAGE 02 VIENNA 02071 10 OF 12 081712Z

70. KHLESTOV RESPONDED THAT, APART FROM THE UNITED STATES, UP TO THE PRESENT, NO ALLIED DELEGATION IN VIENNA HAD SAID ANYTHING DEFINITE ABOUT WHEN AND BY HOW MUCH THEY WERE WILLING TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES. ALL THESE ALLIED CLARIFICATIONS ABOUT THE COMMON CEILING HAD NOT ANSWERED EASTERN QUESTIONS ON THESE POINTS. ALL THESE ALLIED COMMITMENTS TO THE EAST MEANT NOTHING EXCEPT A COMMITMENT TO CONTINUE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND SESSION. HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THE TENOR OF FRG'S REPS REMARKS. AS HE HAD UNDERSTOOD FRG REP'S POINTS, ALLIED REPS WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK FURTHER ABOUT REDUCTIONS OF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ONLY WHEN EAST AGREED TO COMMON CEILING. HE WISHED TO AVOID SHARP VOCABULARY, BUT HE DID NOT THINK THIS A GOOD OR CONSTRUCTIVE WAY TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS. EASTERN REPS HAD ASKED WHEN AND HOW MANY EUROPEAN FORCES WOULD TAKE PART IN NEGOTIATIONS. THEY HAD BEEN PROMISED CLARIFICATIONS IN ORIGINAL SESSION OF THESE TALKS BUT AS YET HAD RECEIVED NONE. WHAT WESTERN REPS HAD NOW HAD SAID TO EASTERN REPS ABOUT THE COMMON CEILING HAD ONLY ADDED TO EASTERN CONCERN ABOUT REDUCTIONS BY WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. EASTERN COUNTRIES HAD COME TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE REDUCTIONS OF ALL PARTICI-

PANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE. THE UNITED STATES HAD ALSO DONE SO. NONE OF THE OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD EXPRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES. THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD CONTINUE TO BRING THEM TO THIS POINT.

71. US REP SAID EASTERN REPS SHOULD CONSIDER MORE CAREFULLY REMARKS BY FRG REP. THEY WERE PLACING EXCESSIVELY NEGATIVE CONNOTATION ON THEM. THEY WERE IN FACT QUITE CONSTRUCTIVE. US REP COUNTERED THAT, AS HE UNDERSTOOD KHLESTOV'S REMARKS DURING THE CURRENT SESSION, EASTERN REPS CONTEMPLATED A SYMBOLIC REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION WHILE NEGOTIATION CONTINUED ON FURTHER REDUCTIONS.

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PAGE 03 VIENNA 02071 10 OF 12 081712Z

ALTHOUGH WEST DID NOT AGREE WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE IDEA OF SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS HE BELIEVED THERE WAS SOME COMMON GROUND IN THE FACT THAT IF A FIRST STAGE WERE ACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST, THE EAST WOULD START IMPLEMENTING IT WHILE CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS.

72. US REP CONTINUED, DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY AD HOC GROUP THAT IN VIEW OF ALLIED REPS, THESE FIRST THREE INFORMAL SESSIONS HAD BEEN USEFUL. ALLIED REPS BELIEVED THEY HAD RESULTED IN CERTAIN HELPFUL CLARIFICATIONS CONCERNING THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES. IT WOULD SEEM THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD ASCERTAINED THE FOLLOWING: WITHIN THE TERMS OF ITS OWN OVERALL APPROACH, THE EASTERN SIDE WAS CONTEMPLATING WITHDRAWAL OF 17 PERCENT OF SOVIET GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL AND 1,500 TANKS FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. UNDER ITS PHASE I PROPOSAL, THE WESTERN SIDE CONTEMPLATED THE REDUCTION OF 15 PERCENT OF SOVIET GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL AND 1700 TANKS. THESE WERE ROUGHLY SIMILAR ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE AS REGARDS SOVIET REDUCTIONS. IN ADDITION, BOTH SIDES APPEARED WILLING TO ENTERTAIN THE IDEA OF SUCCESSIVE STAGES OF NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE SUBJECT MATTER. FURTHER, APPROACHES OF BOTH SIDES APPEARED TO CONTEMPLATE THAT AN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE US AND SOVIET FORCES WOULD IMPOSE CEILINGS ON US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES MANPOWER REMAINING IN THE AREA. BOTH APPROACHES ALSO APPEAR TO RECOGNIZE THAT THIS WOULD IMPLY LIMITATION ON ENTRY OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES MANPOWER INTO THE AREA FOR REPLACEMENT, ROTATION AND EXERCISES. FINALLY, BOTH SIDES APPEAR TO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WILL HAVE TO BE AGREED EXCEPTIONS TO SUCH A LIMITATION IN ORDER TO

ACCOMMODATE THE NEEDS OF BOTH THE US AND USSR TO
REPLACE, ROTATE AND EXERCISE THEIR FORCES IN THE
AREA. THESE WERE AREAS WHICH PARTICIPANTS MAY BE
ABLE TO BUILD ON IN WORKING TOWARD AGREEMENT. ALLIED REPS
ALSO BELIEVE THAT, GIVEN THE REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET
GROUND FORCES ENVISAGED BY EAST, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE
FOR THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS TO CONTEMPLATE TAKING
THESE REDUCTIONS IN THE FORM OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY.

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SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENNA 02071 10 OF 12 081712Z

73. US REP CONCLUDED THAT ALLIES RECOGNIZED THAT
PARTICIPANTS WERE NEGOTIATING ABOUT THE MUTUAL
REDUCTION OF FORCES AND THAT, IN EVERY SUCCESSFUL
NEGOTIATION, THERE WERE TWO SIDES OF A BARGAIN, AND BOTH
SIDES MUST BE SATISFIED AS TO EACH SIDE OF THAT
BARGAIN. BUT IT WOULD MARK A USEFUL ADVANCE IN
THESE NEGOTIATIONS IF PARTICIPANTS IN PRESENT SESSION
WERE ABLE TO ESTABLISH SOME PRELIMINARY COMMON
IDENTIFICATION OF AT LEAST THE SOVIET SIDE OF THE
BARGAIN, I.E. , WHAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE
PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT
ON THIS SUBJECT MATTER.

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 02071 11 OF 12 081803Z

44

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 IO-14

OIC-04 AECE-00 AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00

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RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

SAM-01 (ISO) W

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1910
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 11 OF 12 VIENNA 2071

FROM US REP MBFR

74. HKLESTOV SAID HE TOO WOULD LIKE TO SUMMARIZE HIS OWN UNDERSTANDING OF THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION THUS FAR. ALL PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT THE EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS IN THE PAST THREE SESSIONS HAD BEEN VERY USEFUL. SOME OF THE ASSESSMENTS JUST MADE BY US REP DID NOT IN HIS VIEW REFLECT THE REAL SITUATION. IF US REP'S ESTIMATES WERE ACCEPTED, ONE WOULD BELIEVE THERE WAS SO MUCH COMMON GROUND THAT ONE COULD START NEGOTIATION OF AN AGREEMENT IMMEDIATELY. HOWEVER, EAST COULD NOT SPEAK OF A COMMON APPROACH TO REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN GROUND FORCES MERELY ON THE BASIS OF SIMILARITY OF PERCENTAGES INVOLVED. HE WOULD NOT DEAL WITH THE FIGURES ON THIS OCCASION. IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAT WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES UNDERSTAND
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PAGE 02 VIENNA 02071 11 OF 12 081803Z

EASTERN VIEWS. THE WESTERN APPROACH WAS UNJUST IN PROVIDING ONLY FOR REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN GROUND FORCES. THE WEST WAS ATTEMPTING TO APPLY TO FORCES OF UNEQUAL SIZE THE SAME PERCENTAGE OF REDUCTIONS. THIS GAVE THE WEST A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

75. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT IT HAD BEEN USEFUL DURING THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS THAT A MORE EQUITABLE APPROACH HAD EMERGED WHICH SHOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO FIND ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. IN THE COURSE OF THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS, A CERTAIN IDEA HAD EMERGED CONTAINING THE POSSIBILITY OF SEEKING REALISTIC SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS. THE WESTERN 2-PHASE APPROACH WAS NEITHER JUST NOR FAIR. ON THE OTHER HAND, EASTERN REPS PERCEIVED THAT THE WEST WAS NOT WILLING, AT LEAST NOT IMMEDIATELY, TO ACCEPT THE FULL EASTERN PROGRAM. THEREFORE, THE IDEA OF SEEKING A POSSIBLE SOLUTION IN SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS SEEMED PROMISING. IT WOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE TO EXAMINE THIS POSSIBILITY FURTHER BECAUSE, WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO AVOID MANY OF THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH PREVIOUSLY

BLOCKED PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

76. KHLESTOV CONTINUED THAT, WHILE SEEKING AGREEMENT ON THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS, APPROACH, PARTICIPANTS COULD ALSO CONSIDER A NUMBER OF POSSIBILITIES MENTIONED IN THESE SESSIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, LIMITATIONS ON MOVING IN FORCES FROM THE OUTSIDE. WHILE FURTHER DEVELOPING THE IDEA OF SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS, PARTICIPANTS MIGHT ALSO FIND SOME FLEXIBLE POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER REDUCTIONS. HE WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THIS IDEA OF SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS. DURING DISCUSSION OF THIS IDEA, SOME NEW THOUGHTS HAD APPEARED. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT ALLIED REPS HAD NOT YET THOUGHT THEM THROUGH. PARTICIPANTS SHOULD FOCUS THEIR WORK IN THE NEAR FUTURE ON THIS POSSIBILITY OF SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS. THERE WERE SOME POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THIS. IT IS TRUE THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES FOR BOTH SIDES INVOLVED. BUT, DURING FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THIS CONCEPT, PARTICIPANTS WOULD GET A CLEARER IDEA OF WHAT COULD BE DONE WITH REGARD TO IT. OF COURSE, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO
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SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 02071 11 OF 12 081803Z

HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSION OF OTHER ASPECTS LIKE THOSE DISCUSSED EARLIER, BUT IT WOULD BE MORE PRODUCTIVE AND REALISTIC TO FOCUS ON THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS IDEA. THIS WOULD PROVIDE A REALISTIC DIRECTION FOR THE WORK OF THE INFORMAL SESSIONS IN THE NEXT DAYS. TO BE FRANK, EACH PARTICIPANT COULD GO ON AND TALK ABOUT THEIR GENERAL VIEWS, BUT THE 3 PAST SESSIONS SHOWED, IN THE EASTERN VIEW, WHERE THERE WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY OF FORWARD MOVEMENT, IN THE COMPLEX WHICH HE CALLED THE SYMBOLIC APPROACH.

77. US REP SAID PARTICIPANTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO DISCUSS ALL ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE. HE WOULD NOT WISH TO MISLEAD THE SOVIET REP BY MAKING HIM THINK THAT THE ALLIES AGREED WITH HIS APPROACH. FRG SAID HE HOPED KHLESTOV DID NOT FEEL THE SYMBOLIC REDUCTION CONCEPT WAS THE ONLY AREA WHERE PARTICIPANTS COULD MAKE PROGRESS. ALLIED REPS HAD ALREADY EXPLAINED DIFFICULTIES THEY SAW IN THIS PRINCIPLE.

78. THERE FOLLOWED A BRIEF DISCUSSION ON FREQUENCY OF PLENARIES. KHLESTOV SAID EAST HAD ACTED IN GOOD FAITH IN CALLING PLENARY FOR MARCH 12 ON ASSUMPTION THAT ALLIED PROPOSAL FOR ONE PLENARY HAD BEEN SPECIFIC RAHTER THAN GENERAL AND LIMITED TO PAST WEEK. KHLESTOV SUGGESTED THAT STRULAK CHECK WITH HIS OTHER EASTERN COLLEAGUES AND IF NO ONE WISHED TO SPEAK IN PLENARY ANNOUNCED BY

CZECHOSLOVAK REP KLEIN FOR MARCH 12, EAST WOULD BE WILLING TO DROP IT AND TO LIMIT PLENARIES FOR NEXT WEEK TO ONE SESSION ON MARCH 14. KHLESTOV INDICATED UNWILLINGNESS TO DROP ONE PLENARY DEFINITELY FROM PRESENT TWO A WEEK SCHEDULE. HE SAID THIS "WOULD CREATE A BAD IMPRESSION." HE SAID EAST WOULD BE WILLING ON AD HOC BASIS TO CANCEL THOSE PLENARIES WHERE NO REPRESENTATIVE HAD REPORTED DESIRE TO SPEAK. ALLIED REPS SAID THEY WOULD DISCUSS THIS MATTER FURTHER WITH THEIR

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 02071 12 OF 12 081825Z

42

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 IO-14

OIC-04 AECE-00 AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00

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RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01

SAM-01 (ISO) W

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1911

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 12 OF 12 VIENNA 2071

FROM US REP MBFR

COLLEAGUES.

79. US DEP REP SAID HE WISHED TO REFER ON PERSONAL BASIS, BECAUSE THERE HAD NOT BEEN ANY OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS

ISSUE AMONG ALLIES, TO PROCEDURAL INTERVENTION BY KHLESTOV IN PLENARY EARLIER SAME DAY. US DEP REP STATED THAT THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUNE 28 COMMUNIQUE MADE IT UNMISTAKEABLY CLEAR THAT THE ALLIES HAD HAD IN MIND UNDER THE TERM ASSOCIATED MEASURES STABILIZING MEASURES PRECISELY OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED BY THE CANADIAN AND BELGIAN REPS IN THE LAST TWO ALLIED PLENARY PRESENTATIONS. FURTHERMORE, ALLIED REPS HAD AT THAT TIME MADE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO EASTERN REPS, INCLUDING KHLESTOV, THAT IT WAS THEIR INTENTION TO BRING UP SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS TYPE UNDER THE HEADING OF SECRET

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PAGE 02 VIENNA 02071 12 OF 12 081825Z

ASSOCIATED MEASURES. HENCE KHLESTOV AND EASTERN REPS COULD HAVE BEEN UNDER NO MISAPPREHENSION AS ALLIED INTENTIONS WHEN LATTER AGREED TO PHRASE "ASSOCIATED MEASURES" FOR INCLUSION IN JUNE 28 COMMUNIQUE. IN FACT, THE TERM "ASSOCIATED MEASURES" ITSELF HAD BEEN PROPOSED BY ALLIES RATHER THAN EAST TO REPLACE AN EASTERN FORMULATIONS AND ALLIED REPS HAD EXPLAINED JUST WHAT THEY HAD IN MIND.

80. US DEP REP SAID HE THOUGH KHLESTOV WAS MAKING A MISTAKE IN RAISING PROCEDURAL ISSUE ON THIS TOPIC. PERHAPS EAST WAS NOT AT FIRST SIGHT IMPRESSED BY CONTENT OF THESE PRESENTATIONS. THIS MIGHT CHANGE. ON THE OTHER HAND, WESTERN REPS WERE NOT IMPRESSED BY MUCH OF CONTENT OF EASTERN PRESENTATIONS. IT WAS CORRECT THAT THE JUNE 28 COMMUNIQUE REFERRED TO SUBJECTS IRRELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT MATTER. IT WAS EQUALLY A FACT THAT THERE WAS AND COULD BE NO COMPLETELY COMPREHENSIVE COMMON DEFINITION OF WHAT WAS RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT MATTER ALTHOUGH THERE WAS GOOD GENERAL UNDERSTANDING ON THIS POINT. THAT BEING SO, IT WAS MANIFEST THAT EACH OF THE SIDES WOULD HAVE TO DETERMINE FOR ITSELF WHAT IT CONSIDERED RELEVANT WITHIN THE RANGE OF THESE TOPICS DISCUSSED IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS. IT WAS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT IF ONE SIDE BEGAN TO CHALLENGE SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS IN THE POSITION OF THE OTHER SIDE WHICH IT DID NOT FIND ATTRACTIVE, THE NET RESULT WOULD BE THAT EACH SIDE WOULD BE ENGAGING IN A COMPETITION OF CHALLENGING SUCH ELEMENTS. THIS WAS A RISKY AND MISTAKEN COURSE. HE WISHED TO BRING THESE POINTS TO KHLESTOV'S ATTENTION ON A PERSONAL BASIS; HE WAS SURE THE SUBJECT WOULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER.

81. KHLESTOV SAID HE BELIEVED HE HAD GOTTEN QUITE CORRECTLY THE UNDERSTANDING WHICH HAD BEEN REACHED IN THE COMMUNIQUE AND WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED WITH REGARD TO ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN THE ORAL UNDERSTANDING ON THAT TOPIC. IT WAS OF COURSE TRUE THAT THERE WAS NO COMMON INTERPRETATION OF WHAT ISSUES WERE ASSOCIATED WITH REDUCTIONS AND WHAT WAS NOT. OF COURSE, PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE TO BE GUIDED BY LOGIC IN DETERMINING WHAT WAS RELEVANT TO REDUCTIONS AND WHAT WAS NOT, AND THE RULE OF COMMON SENSE WOULD HAVE TO BE APPLIED. THAT WAS WHY HE

HAD ASKED FRG REP THREE SESSIONS PREVIOUS TO EXPLAIN THE
RELATIONSHIP OF THE MEASURES IN QUESTION TO REDUCTIONS.
HE HAD RECOGNIZED THAT THE ISSUES RAISED WERE MILITARY ISSUES
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PAGE 03 VIENNA 02071 12 OF 12 081825Z

BUT HE HAD ASKED HOW THESE POINTS WERE CONNECTED WITH THE
VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. HE BELIEVED HIS PROCEDURAL INTERVENTION
IN PLENARY WAS JUSTIFIED AND THAT HIS STATEMENT CORRESPONDED
TO WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED DURING THE PREPARATORY TALKS. AS REGARDS
THE FLEXIBILITY AND PATIENCE WHICH MIGHT BE EXPECTED FROM
PARTICIPANTS, EASTERN REPS HAD ALSO DEMONSTRATED THESE QUALITIES.
HE HAD NOT RAISED THIS ISSUE EARLIER AND EVEN SO, COULD HAVE
RAISED IT DURING THE PRESENTATION BY THE BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE
EARLIER THE SAME DAY. THE EAST WAS GOING TO SHOW THE MAXIMUM
OF TOLERANCE, BUT THEY WISHED ALLIED REPS TO KNOW OF THEIR VIEWS.

82. US DEP REP SAID HE BELIEVED HE HAD MADE SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR
POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF KHLESTOV'S ACTIONS.

83. IT WAS AGREED TO CONTINUE THE ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS ON
THE BASIS OF THE DISCUSSION ITEMS PREVIOUSLY DEFINED, WITH THE
NEXT SESSION TO BE HELD ON MARCH 11. HUMES

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
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